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Abstract. The impacts of natural hazards as well as their fre-
quency of occurrence during the last decades have increased
decisively. Therefore, the public as well as the private sector
are expected to react to this development by providing sufﬁ-
cient funds, in particular for the improvement of protection
measures and an enhanced funding of damage compensation
for affected private individuals, corporate and public entities.
From the public stance, the establishment of an appropri-
ate regulatory environment seems to be indispensable. Struc-
tural and legal changes should, on the one hand, renew and
improve the current distribution system of public catastrophe
funds as well as the proﬁtable investment of these ﬁnancial
resources, and on the other hand, facilitate the application of
alternativemechanismsprovidedbythecapitalandinsurance
markets.
In particular, capital markets have developed alternative
risk transfer and ﬁnancing mechanisms, such as captive in-
surance companies, risk pooling, contingent capital solu-
tions, multi-trigger products and insurance securitisation for
hard insurance market phases. These instruments have al-
ready been applied to catastrophic (re-)insurance in other
countries (mainly the US and off-shore domiciles), and may
contribute positively to the insurability of extreme weather
events in Austria by enhancing ﬁnancial capacities. Not only
private individuals and corporate entities may use alternative
mechanisms in order to retain, thus, to ﬁnance certain risks,
but also public institutions.
This contribution aims at analysing potential solutions for
an improved risk management of natural hazards in the pri-
vate and the public sector by considering alternative mech-
anisms of the capital and insurance markets. Also the es-
tablishment of public-private-partnerships, which may con-
tribute to a more efﬁcient cat funding system in Austria, is
considered.
Correspondence to: M. Gruber
(monika.gruber@uibk.ac.at)
1 Introduction – The current cat funding system
in Austria
As in most European countries, the catastrophe funding sys-
tem in Austria bases upon two main pillars: the public catas-
trophe fund and the private insurance industry. These two
institutions do not collaborate very closely. Damage com-
pensation payments are coordinated only in a few speciﬁc
cases, as e.g. in the case of hail insurance for the agricultural
sector.
In 1966, the ﬁrst Austrian Catastrophe Fund Act1 was
passed, which provided ﬁnancial means for preventive mea-
sures conducted by the WLV2 in collaboration with local au-
thorities and for rendering assistance to the Austrian federal
states in terms of supportive payments to the injured. Today
the WLV is organised as a special department of the Aus-
trian Ministry of Life, which is responsible for taking action
in the ﬁeld of agriculture, forestry, environmental and water
management. The activities of the WLV focus on mountain
torrent and avalanche protection but also on the protection
against a variety of other natural hazards. Until the next le-
gal amendment, the cat fund was ﬁnanced by imposing sur-
charges on the Income Tax, the Tax on Wages, the Capital
Returns Tax and the Corporation Tax.
After several extensions and amendments the Austrian
Catastrophe Fund Act was renewed in 1985.3 One year later,
in the year of Tschernobyl, new regulations had to be imple-
mented in order to provide sufﬁcient funds to the victims of
the nuclear catastrophe.4
1Katastrophenfondsgesetz 1966 (Catastrophe Fund Act),
BGBl. 207/1966.
2“Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung”, i.e. mountain torrent and
avalance protection.
3Katastrophenfondsgesetz 1985 (Catastrophe Fund Act),
BGBl. 539/1984.
4Katastrophenfondsgesetz 1986 (Catastrophe Fund Act),
BGBl. 396/1986.
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After several years without major catastrophes the fund
reserves had accumulated to almost 200mio.Euro in 1995
and had to be reallocated to another purpose of use. Due
to this development the Austrian Court of Audit suggested
new regulations concerning the management of cat fund re-
serves. Basing on these suggestions, the currently effective
Catastrophe Fund Act5 was put into force, which imposed a
limitation of accumulated fund reserves at max. 29mio.Euro
per annum. Every year about 300 to 350mio.Euro of tax rev-
enues are allocated to the catastrophe fund.6
Along §9(2) Finanzausgleichsgesetz 20057 the cat fund is
endowed with 1.1% of the annual tax revenue of the Income
Tax, the Tax on Wages, the Capital Returns Tax and the Cor-
poration Tax. The Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance can
also grant additional ﬁnancial means in case of extraordinary
catastrophes by enacting special laws.8
Currently 73.27% of the fund are invested into preventive
measures against ﬂood and avalanche events, the assessment
of water quality, the establishment of warning and alarm sys-
tems, grants to frost and hail insurance premiums9 in the
agricultural sector, the coverage of extraordinary damages
to agricultural regions, the purchase of additional roughage
(in particular in the years 2002 and 2005), and the coverage
of costs associated with the prevention of water contamina-
tion.10
The funds’ ﬁnancial means are distributed among the Aus-
trian Federation (“Bund”), the federal states (“Laender”) and
the local authorities (“Gemeinden”) subject to the laws. In
addition, an emphasis is placed on catastrophe prevention by
means of prudent spatial planning and hazard zone mapping.
Sincethebeginningof2006, theFederalMinistryofAgricul-
ture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management provides
the hazard zone mapping system HORA, which can be used
by insurance companies for the insurance premium calcula-
tion and their adjustment to the HORA ﬂood and earthquake
risk zones. 11
Beside the chance of being supported by the public catas-
trophe fund in an emergency (claims can not be asserted),
privateorbusinessentitiesmayalsoinsurewithprivateinsur-
ance companies. Beside those insurance companies that are
headquartered in Austria, the freedom of services and estab-
5Katastrophenfondsgesetz 1996 (Strukturanpassungsgesetz
1996), BGBl. 201/1996.
6See Federal Ministry of Finance, www.bmf.gv.at, 08.04.08.
7Finanzausgleichsgesetz 2005 (ﬁscal sharing provisions),
BGBl. I 156/2004.
8In 2002 the so-called HWG 2002 added 500mio.Euro to the
fund; in 2005 the additional funds granted by the HWG 2005
amounted 251mio.Euro. See Federal Ministry of Finance, www.
bmf.gv.at, 08.04.08.
9§§1 and 2 Hagelversicherungs-Foerdergesetz (hail insurance
provisions), BGBl. 64/1955.
10Wasserrechtsgesetz 1959 (water right), BGBl. 215/1959.
11SeeFederalMinistryofAgriculture, Forestry, Environmentand
Water Management, HORA, www.hochwasserrisiko.at.
lishment allows insurance companies headquartered in any
European member state to write policies in all other member
state (under consideration of regulations concerning the mu-
tual recognition of insurance concessions). In 2007, 708 in-
surance companies were headquartered in the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA).12
Despite this obviously large range of insurance facilities
many households and companies are still uninsured. In par-
ticular, since the implementation of enhanced hazard zone
maps, such as HORA, insurers are better informed about the
actual risk exposure of property. Thus, at present, they ei-
ther provide policies with very limited coverage for dam-
ages arising from natural hazards, or require higher insur-
ance premiums for buildings situated in endangered zones.
For strongly endangered areas most insurers even ceased to
underwrite this type of risk. According to the Austrian Un-
derwriting Association most insurance companies situated in
Austria cover for damages to private buildings and house-
holds on average up to 7500Euro. Only a few insurers pay
up to 50% of the amount insured (actually, 50% of the maxi-
mum limit). Business entities are granted more ﬂexible con-
tract conditions than private households. As business entities
also have access to combined policies (in particular “all risk
policies”), higher covers for damages are available. But even
these policies can not cover for all types of hazardous events
and regularly exclude extraordinary, i.e. extreme events.
As the number and intensity of catastrophic events seems
to rise continuously, both the public and the private sector
have realised the need for another renewal of the cat fund-
ing system. In the following, some remarks will be made
concerning capacity constraints in insurance markets, “alter-
native” solutions provided by capital and insurance markets,
as well as the feasibility of Public Private Partnerships.
2 Some remarks on insurance market capacity
Because of the increasing amount of damages caused by nat-
ural hazards in recent years, not only Austrian but also in-
ternationally operating insurance and reinsurance companies
frequently emphasise, that they would no longer be able to
cover all damages to insured property, if this trend was to
be continued in future. “In the wake of the 2005 US hurri-
cane season and growing concerns about natural disasters in
the years ahead, obtaining sufﬁcient insurance coverage for
catastrophic loss has been extraordinarily difﬁcult for many
of our clients,” said Brian Storms, Chairman and Chief Ex-
ecutive Ofﬁcer of Marsh (Marsh, 2007).
Several scientiﬁc papers have discussed the issue of scarce
capacity in insurance markets and used various arguments in
order to explain the reasons for the existence of such con-
straints.
12Directive 73/239/EWG, OJ 1973 L 228/3, Directive
88/357/EWG, OJ 1988 L 172/1, Directive 92/49/EWG, OJ
1992 L 228/1.
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Primarily, two schools of thought can be identiﬁed: ca-
pacity constraint and arbitrage theory. Both theories aim at
explaining the underwriting cycle, in particular, the stage of
rapidly increasing premiums and proﬁtability typically asso-
ciatedwithdecreasingcapacity. Emphasisisgenerallyputon
the relationship between capacity and market prices (and/or
underwriting proﬁt margins) and if this relationship actually
exists.
Capacity constraint models (see for example Bloom,
1987; Winter, 1988; Gron, 1989, 1991), assume that this
cyclical phenomenon is mainly caused by real frictions and
imperfections in insurance markets. In the case of major
shocks, such as natural catastrophes, the insurers’ net worth
is inﬂuenced negatively and the supply curve for insurance
cover is shifted to the left. In addition, risks associated with
the underwritten policies are assumed to be imperfectly di-
versiﬁable.
As insurers need to hold a certain net worth in order to
avoid bankruptcies and to be capable of meeting all claims
made by policyholders, the cost of capital plays an important
role in capital-constraint models. Winter (1988) and Gron
(1989) both argue that capital from internal sources is less
costly than capital from external sources. Therefore insurers
will normally hold relatively high amounts of equity capital
to ensure claims that exceed the expected losses.
In order to cope with a shock in the short-run and to adjust
steadily to the long-run equilibrium, insurers preferably in-
crease prices after such events and then accumulate retained
earnings. By this means, demand is reduced which helps
insurers to recover the initial net worth and to adjust prices
downwards, when converging towards the long-run equilib-
rium again.
Therefore, capacity constraint theory, which mainly uses
supply (and demand) arguments, assumes the existence of
a negative relationship between capacity and underwriting
proﬁt margins. The underwriting proﬁt margin is a proﬁtabil-
ity measure for insurance companies: “revenues – costs” in
relation to “revenues” (see also Gron, 1991). When capacity
is low, prices and, thus, the underwriting proﬁt margins, are
high until the insurer has recovered again.
In contrast to the capital constraint theory, which argues
with endogenous market imperfections, arbitrage models
base their argumentation upon the existence of – mostly ex-
ogenously given – institutional lags, accounting practices
and regulatory lags. Capital is assumed to adjust quickly
and without considerable costs. Further assumptions of these
models are free market entry and the existence of competitive
markets. As a consequence, the effects stemming from ma-
jor shocks don’t persist in the long-run, because capital can
be acquired easily and almost costlessly. Thus, the price of
insurance coverage simply equals the present value of costs
(associated with the actuarial risk covered by the insurance
policy over the entire contract period). The supply curve is
not expected to be shifted in the short-run after major events.
Consequently, a continuous adjustment towards a long-run
equilibrium is not necessary.
In essence, arbitrage theory blames the instability of the
regulatory environment for being the main driver of the in-
surance market cycle, in particular, of capacity crises. “A
change in law can cause a revision of the expected loss for
all policies that are currently outstanding but which have al-
ready been priced.” (See Doherty and Posey, 1997, p. 56.)
Inappropriate loss forecasting and ratemaking methods used
by insurers as well as institutional lags, changes in the eco-
nomic environment, inﬂow of capital to the insurance mar-
ket are also dealt as triggers for shifts of the long-run supply
curve (see Venezian, 1985; Cummins and Outreville, 1987).
Finally, these models don’t ﬁnd any systematic relationship
between capacity and underwriting margins.
The arbitrage models have been expanded and combined
in different ways. In various papers capital market concepts
are applied to insurance pricing, such as the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (see Hill, 1979; Fairley, 1979; Cummins et al.,
2002), the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (see Kraus and Ross,
1982) or corporate debt models (see Merton, 1974; Cummins
and Danzon, 1997; Doherty and Garven, 1986).
Doherty and Garven (1995) combined the idea of present
value and capital constraint models. They found that changes
in interest rates cause changes in the level of underwriting
proﬁts. In case that an insurer suffers from an asset liability
duration mismatch, this change can also affect the value of
the insurer’s equity and disturb its capital structure. Conse-
quently, capital adjustments after an interest variation can be
more costly for this ﬁrm, as the access to equity capital may
becomemoredifﬁcult. Thisshowsmoreevidenceoffrictions
in responding to changing capital market conditions, which
ﬁnally supports the capacity constraint models of insurance
market cycles.
Froot (2001) takes a broader point of view on risk man-
agement and capacity issues in respect of catastrophic rein-
surance. After conducting a reinsurance market analysis he
states that protection for high-risk layers is often not pur-
chased or simply not available, and that prices regularly de-
viate from fair values. Froot (2001) ﬁnds evidence for eight
potential explanations for this deviation from risk manage-
ment theory, which would suggest a perfect hedging strategy
againstsuchhighrisk. Fiveofhiseighthypothesesbaseupon
supply-side shifts, three explanations focus on demand-side
deviations.
First, a reason for capacity constraints might simply be,
that there is insufﬁcient capital in the reinsurance market as
holding large amounts of collateral on the balance sheet is
costly for any reinsurer. Financing imperfections (see also
Froot and O’Connell (1997)), adverse selection and agency
issues might make external capital too costly after poor per-
formance (due to a catastrophic event). He argues further,
that capital market shortages can prevent reinsurers from in-
vesting more into mitigation measuers, which would reduce
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the size of the entire cat risk pool. But reinsurers rather avoid
high upfront expenditures.
Second, Froot hypothesizes that especially reinsurers can
use their market power to keep capacities at a certain level
and to impose premiums that are calculated above fair value.
Thus, reinsurers tend to consolidate in order to gain more
market power, to proﬁt from economies of scale and to re-
duce the costs of obtaining external capital. But as far as cat
bond issuances have shown, deviations from fair prices seem
to be driven by the existence of barriers to reinsurance mar-
ket entry rather than by capacity constraints, as cat bonds
only added a tiny fraction to the total reinsurance capac-
ity. Thus, what cat bonds actually account for is the release
of barriers to the reinsurance markets (regarding the market
power argument see also Froot and O’Connell (1997)).
Third, Froot discusses the potential impact of frictional
costs on reinsurance premiums. Premiums are assumed to
be high because ﬁnancial instruments as well as reinsurance
contracts are illiquid and have high transaction and broker-
age costs. Furthermore, reinsurance companies manage their
risks by means of aggregate limits rather than risk exposures,
which can also lead to frictional inefﬁciencies and, again,
costs. These costs need to be considered when setting up
contract conditions, i.e. premiums. Improved reinsurer risk
allocationcouldhelptoreducethecostofcapitalevenincase
that ﬁnancing imperfections are in place.
Fourth, moral hazard and adverse selection can be consid-
ered as market distorting factors that inﬂuence reinsurance
premiums and capacity. But Froot argues that they seem to
play a “relatively harmless” role for cat reinsurance, in com-
parison to other forms of insurance and reinsurance, because
catastrophic reinsurance policies are usually associated with
high deductibles and coinsurance structures. Indeed, risk re-
tention and low-risk layers tend to be most affected by moral
hazard and adverse selection.
Fifth, ex-post third party intervention is blamed to be the
driver of a decrease in reinsurance demand after a catas-
trophic event. As soon as governmental funds are dedicated
to catastrophe funding and/or state aid programs are initiated,
the incentive for entering into a private insurance contract is
weakened. In this case, a decrease in private insurance de-
mand results in lower insurance prices and lower capacity on
the reinsurance market.
Sixth, it is argued, that the corporate form of reinsurance
could be inefﬁcient. Agency costs in association with in-
transparent reinsurance contracts and a strong inﬂuence of
underwriting managers, who aim at gaining larger market
share and providing shareholders with higher returns, might
result in an inefﬁcient allocation of market resources and, ﬁ-
nally, to lower capacities provided by reinsurers.
Seventh, as managers (underwriting agents) are said to pri-
marily maximise the value of their equity rather than the
ﬁrm value, the shareholders’ interests (high return on in-
vested capital) override policyholders’ interests (low premi-
ums, high degree of insuranace cover). Thus, insurance man-
agers avoid to underwrite high risk policies in order to reduce
the need for – costly – high-risk reinsurance. Due to these
agency issues, reinsurance demand may be restricted.
Finally, Froot hypothesizes that reinsurance demand is
dampened due to behavioural factors. He argues that the
perceived likelihood that reinsurance will pay in the case of
catastrophic events might be “too low to matter”. For this
reason, the importance of high-risk covers is often underval-
ued, i.e. reinsurance in these layers is likely to be neglected.
As another behavioural aspect Froot mentions, that a lack of
clarity associated with catastrophic risk could make insureds
willing to pay higher premiums than suggested by expected
utility theory.13
Froot concludes that these behavioural issues can only
explain some elements of cat reinsurance buying patterns.
The actual management of catastrophic risk seems to deviate
substantially from the pattern suggested by theoretical ap-
proaches. In one point he agrees with theory: reinsurance
cover is regularly overpriced.
In contrast to the broad perspective on the reinsurance
market discussed above, Jaffee and Russell (1996) concen-
trate on the question why insurers do not hold large catas-
trophe reserves. Accounting rules against the earmarking of
funds, tax provisions, opportunity costs (in terms of using
the fund for lucrative takeovers, high dividend payments to
shareholders, or the reduction of insurance premiums), and
regulatory constraints (e.g. premium limitations or manda-
toryinsuranceassociatedwiththeinsurer’sobligationtocon-
tract) are presented as being the main reason for reinsurers’
reluctance to aggregate catastrophe reserve funds. The au-
thors suggest to improve the acceptance for earmarking of
funds, to enhance ex ante funding and to permit alternative
means of funding. These measures might help to return to
fair insurance premiums and expand capacities due to a more
efﬁcient capital allocation.
Beside the arguments discussed above, another approach
tries to explain the problems associated with natural hazard
insurance focusing on the characteristic features of this risk
and, in particular, on the concept of insurability. Business
entities may either try to avoid, minimise or limit such risks,
or apply mechanisms for retaining, funding or transferring
them. Traditionally risk is transferred by entering into an
insurance contract.
Berliner (1982) and Karten (1972) amongst others deter-
mined criteria of insurability, such as the randomness, the
independence, the uniqueness and the predictability, i.e. the
frequency and the size of the risk event. Only if these criteria
13Also the basic papers in the ﬁeld of Behavioural Finance de-
scribe an underweighting effect for moderate and high probabil-
ity events. On the other hand people generally tend to overweigh
rather low probabilities. However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979);
Kunreuther (1984); Slovic et al. (1977) among others showed that
people rather neglect very low probability events and, thus are not
willing to insure against such events, even when high losses are ex-
pected.
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are met, the risk is considered as being insurable on the tra-
ditional market. Otherwise the risks are denominated “unin-
surable” and need to be managed in a different – alternative
– way.
The risk of natural catastrophes generally fulﬁlls the in-
surability criteria of randomness. Human beings can not di-
rectly inﬂuence the loss distribution for example by initiating
the occurrence of such events. Randomness is also a crucial
criterion regarding moral hazard in insurance decisions. In-
sured events which are completely random will hardly cause
moral hazard problems for the insurer (see Froot, 2001). In
the case of natural catastrophes, moral hazard can only indi-
rectly be an issue if the insureds neglect their due diligence
e.g. concerning the maintenance of protection measures.
The criterium of independence is fulﬁlled if losses do
not occur simultaneaously and from the same cause to large
numbers of policyholders. Natural hazard events can be seen
as globally insurable (see Cummins, 2007), as they are usu-
ally independent of losses in other geographical areas. On
the other hand they can hardly be diversiﬁed or reinsured on
a local scale because they regularly trigger a large number of
policies in similar risk classes at the same time within a cer-
tain region. Therefore, cumulation risk among the “natcat”-
policies is a major issue in this context which makes it difﬁ-
cult, particularly for direct insurers, to write policies on these
risks.
Problems may also arise concerning the predictability,
thus the frequency and the size of catastrophic risk. As ex-
treme events typically occur on a very unfrequent basis, there
is only scarce data that could be used for computations. Fur-
thermore, catastrophic risks are also called low frequency –
high severity risks, which implies that the size of the poten-
tial damage is remarkable. In addition, catastrophic events
can not easily be determined and segregated from other in-
sured events (uniqueness of the insured event/risk). For ex-
ample, if a policy includes ﬂood events this does not imply
that damages caused by a simultaneous debris ﬂows will also
be covered by this policy. In practice it will be difﬁcult to
identify the damages caused by the ﬂood on the one hand and
the debris ﬂow on the other hand (for a more detailed discus-
sion of insurability see Faure, 1995; Gollier, 1997; Holsboer,
1995; Vat´ e and Dror, 2002; Kunreuther, 2002, among many
others).
Thus, catastrophic risk may remain uninsured because of
the risk’s characteristic features, which complicate actuarial
pricing. The inaccurateness and uncertainty associated with
these calculations lead to insurance premiums being set at a
relatively high level in order to cover for estimation errors.
Consequently, market supply and demand are affected which
will regularly cause the market to change.
For the Austrian insurance market several arguments men-
tioned above appear to be applicable in order to explain the
current situation. Austrian insurance companies increased
their premiums and restricted their maximal compensation
payments to very low levels after the ﬂood events of 2002
and 2005. Thus, the catastrophe seemed to have inﬂuenced
the underwriting cycle by reducing capacities in the years
2002 and 2005 leaving behind a rather limited insurance sup-
ply. So a certain connection between insurance underwriting
cycles and the capacity issue appears to be existing in this
case, which supports capacity constraint theory.
Furthermore, one can ﬁnd evidence for the arguments of
arbitrage models, as in all European member states new di-
rectives have been put into force in the last decade, such
as Directive 2002/13/EC on solvency margins, Directive
2002/87/EC on the supplementary supervision of ﬁnancial
conglomerates, or Regulation (EC)1606/2002 on the appli-
cation of International Accounting Standards. These regula-
tions, which also have to be integrated into the Austrian legal
framework, can be seen as institutional and accounting lags,
i.e. the main drivers of insurance markets in arbitrage mod-
els. Besides, inappropriate loss forecasting may have been
an issue as the large part of the Austrian insurance compa-
nies obtain loss calculations, loss forecasting and ratemaking
methodsfromthelargeEuropebasedreinsurancecompanies.
These computations and simulations are generally very pre-
cise, but for the Austrian geographical area there may not be
sufﬁcient data to measure risk exposures and insurance pre-
miums in the ﬁeld of natural hazards in an appropriate way.
Thus, both approaches are able to explain insurance market
cycles and capacity deviations in Austria.
The Austrian insurance market also shows evidence for
most of the arguments presented in Froot (2001). In partic-
ular, the issue of third party intervention, i.e. governmental
funding, turned out to be a crucial aspect. For example, own-
ersof buildingswhich weredamaged bythe avalancheevents
of Galtr in 1999 were offered special insurance policies by -
a few risk tolerant – insurers. But they mostly rejected these
offers arguing that the government would fund a whole pro-
gram of protection measures which would render such insur-
ance policies unnecessary in future.
Also, the unequal distribution and allocation of funds to
the federal states of Austria forms part of the general dis-
cussion about the catastrophe fund. After the ﬂood events
in 2002 and 2005 the regulations and criteria regarding the
distribution of funds among the persons concerned strongly
differed among the federal states. Many times insured peo-
ple were not compensated additionaly by the catastrophe
fund, although the policies regularly covered a maximum of
7500Euro which is something like a drop in the ocean if a
family’s entire house is destroyed. In this case, it would have
been better to be uninsured against natural hazards in order
to get more out of the catastrophe fund, which shows that the
incentive scheme in Austria is negatively inﬂuenced by third
party intervention.
Other arguments mentioned by Froot (2001) are also rel-
evant for the Austrian landscape. According to the Austrian
Insurance Supervisory Law insurance companies can only be
established in certain corporate forms, such as stock corpo-
rations or mutual insurance associations. In Austria most
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primary insurers are stock corporations which are expected
to reward shareholders with a constant rate of return on their
investments. This may cause agency issues to have a certain
impactontheallocationofresourcesinthecompanyandalso
on the underwriting policy of agents, who will tend to avoid
underwriting of high risk policies. The latter would afford
the building of major reserves on the balance sheet which is
notpreferableregardingshareholdervaluemaximisation(see
Jaffee and Russell, 1996). Also the cost of capital mustn’t be
neglected in this context. On the other hand, it will proba-
bly be much easier for stock companies than for mutuals to
access additional capital ressources and to reduce the overall
risk by means of diversiﬁcation. In particular large reinsur-
ance (stock) companies should thereby be able to dampen the
impactofagencyissuesandtomaybeevenusetheunderwrit-
ten risk in order to gain higher proﬁts (see Viswanathan and
Cummins, 2003).
Moreover, since the beginning of 2007 the IFRS, which
prohibits catastrophe and equalisation provisions, have to be
applied by Austrian insurers. This may be another incentive
to reduce high-risk policies in the insurers’ portfolios, but
at the same time it may be an incentive to apply innovative
ﬁnancing structures.
Moral hazard and adverse selection can also have an im-
pact on the Austrian market for natural hazard insurance. Al-
though one can not directly inﬂuence the occurrence of the
insured event, moral hazard can be realised when protection
measures are not established or not well maintained so that
the individual behaviour changes the actual exposure, which
the insurer might not necessarily be aware of. These prob-
lems will be present with insurance contracts in general, in-
dependently of the Austrian system. In order to reduce moral
hazard associated with traditional insurance policies the in-
surer should implement control mechanisms or impose cer-
tain conditions in order to preserve the highest possible level
of randomness of the insured risk.
While the arguments of market power and frictional costs
associated with reinsurance contracts rather seem to be of
general importance as well, the availability of capital in the
(re)insurance market seems to matter in particular for Aus-
tria. After the ﬂood events of 2002 and 2005 insurers limited
theirsupplyofnaturalhazardpoliciesasotherwiseadditional
collateral would have been needed in order to guarantee the
companies’ ﬁnancial stability in the case of natural catastro-
phes occurring.
Having considered theoretical as well as empirical argu-
ments accounting for a lack of (re-)insurance in differing
ways, we can now turn to alternative solutions that might
help to overcome traditional (re-)insurance market problems.
3 ART – solutions for uninsurable risks?
While the fundamental features of catastrophic risks can not
crucially be amended, new concepts may be able to deal with
the issues presented in Sect. 2. The widely used term “ART”
comprises various forms of alternative risk transfer and ﬁ-
nancing mechanisms (the latter is also referred to as “ARF”).
The notion of risk transfer generally means that actuarial, ﬁ-
nancial, operational and other types of risk can be transferred
fromonebusinessentity toanother. Wheneverthisrisktrans-
fer mechanism is insufﬁcient or inappropriate, capital mar-
ket structures can also be applied in order to manage these
risks by means of specialised funding arrangements. These
instruments are said to be “alternative” as conventional risk
transfer and ﬁnancing structures are amended, combined and
ﬁnally used as alternatives to traditional mechanisms, when-
ever additional cover and capacity is needed.
Primarily companies, but also public institutions and
groups of private individuals can beneﬁt from the advantages
of using instruments such as captive insurance companies,
insurance-linked securities, contingent capital solutions and
ﬁnite risk. In the following paragraphs these mechanisms
are described in more detail. Furthermore, their advantages
regarding the opportunity to overcome capacity and insura-
bility problems will be discussed. Concrete suggestions for
an “alternative” Austrian catastrophe funding will be made
in Sect. 4.
The ﬁrst impulse for the creation of alternatives to tradi-
tional insurance contracts was given by a serious liability-
crisis of the US insurance market in the 1980s. As underwrit-
ers faced a major lack of capacity the government released
major barriers related to insurance market entry by enforc-
ing the US Liability Risk Retention Act 1986 (1988). This
act facilitated the establishment of on-balance sheet reserves
and specialised risk pools for groups of business entities with
similar risk exposure. Since that time an impressing number
of internal and external self-insurance structures has been
established.
Self-insurance, or also “pre-funded retention”, comprises
no actual risk transfer. Risk is retained by the business entity,
which provides cover for future expenditures by building up
loss reserves on its balance sheet. These reserves should be
earmarked, which means that the ﬁrms management ought to
ensure that the funds shall not be used for any other purpose
than the coverage of ex-ante deﬁned economic losses, as for
example claims arising from natural catastrophes of product
liability (see Banks, 2005), Culp (2006).
Beside the original – internal – form of self-insurance sev-
eral external self-insurance structures have emerged, with
captive insurance companies (“captives”) and Risk Retention
Groups being the most widely used. Risk transfer and ﬁnanc-
ing are combined in the way, that special purpose entities
take responsibility for the transformation of risk, instead of
accounting for expected future losses by building earmarked
reserves. As Risk Retention Groups can only be established
in the application area of the US Liability Risk Retention
Act, this structure can not be considered as an alternative so-
lution for Austria.
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Fig. 1. The basic captive reinsurance structure.
In the past, the majority of captives was established by in-
dustrial enterprises in off-shore domiciles as legally separate
corporate entities, which insure and/or fund risks that can not
(or only against overpriced premiums) be insured via tradi-
tional contracts. Captives can either be set up by one single
company (Single-Parent) or by multiple companies (Multi-
Parent) and can take the form of a direct insurer of rein-
surer. In any case, corporate risks are transferred from parent
companies to the captive against the payment of a premium,
which can be compared with traditional insurance structures.
But captives offer additional beneﬁts to their users. They
can help to smooth and systematically protect the balance
sheet of the parent company. They provide the parent with
pre-funded and proﬁtably invested ﬁnancial means whenever
loss cover is needed. Being a shareholder the parent is in-
volved in the decision making process and participates di-
rectly in the positive as well as negative development of the
captive. This gives an incentive for risk preventive measures
within the parent company and may contribute to the deple-
tion of moral hazard and to the improvement of the entire
risk management process. So, captives help to overcome
moral hazard and agency issues mentioned in Sect. 2 by al-
lowing for individually optimal and mostly high deductibles
as well as participation in the captive’s proﬁt or loss. It also
provides the company with additional ﬁnancial means, not
only from insurance but also from capital markets. In ad-
dition, these structures give companies the opportunity of di-
rectly accessing reinsurance markets – beside capital markets
– which would otherwise be impossible. This ﬁnally leads to
an expansion of capacities, as on the one hand the market
for catastrophic risk is enlarged and on the other hand syner-
gies regarding risk assessment and simulation techniques can
bring beneﬁts.
In addition, a captive beneﬁts from low taxation of invest-
ment and premium income in off-shore domiciles, ﬂexible
structures due to the relatively small size of these companies
in comparison to traditional (re-)insurers. Captives are also
said to be less dependent on insurance market cycles than
traditional insurers. Finally, a captive can be liquidated eas-
ily, if it is not needed any more (see Lee and Ligon, 2001;
Eisenhauer, 2004; Booth, 2006).
But the captive concept also has to be viewed critically as
several taxation issues are still not clearly regulated. There-
fore in certain cases (depending on the domicile of the cap-
tive and the parent) the concept might be associated with cer-
tainlegalrisk. Moreover, itisafact, thatthehighertheparent
company’s annual premium volume, the more cost efﬁcient
the captive. Thus, smaller business entities should prefer-
ably use special group captives or rent-a-captive solutions
(see Culp, 2006). Figure 1 shows a basic captive reinsurance
structure.
Another solution for public and private catastrophe
funding is provided by capital markets, in particular by
Insurance-Linked Securities, such as cat bonds, insurance
and weather derivatives, or contingent capital solutions.
Most of these instruments base upon a securitisation process,
which can be explained as the transformation (i.e. pooling
and re-structuring) of illiquid assets or liabilities from the
balance sheet into marketable securities. Companies acting
in different industries apply this mechanism in order to cope
with a wide range of risks. Insurance and weather derivatives
as well as index-based cat bonds, being a speciﬁc ﬁeld of
application, are also referred to as catastrophe index-linked
securities (see Lane, 2002).
Catastrophe bonds securitise risks associated with natural
hazards. In particular, reinsurance companies and large cor-
porations issued cat bonds in order to reinsure or retrocede
these low frequency – high severity risks appearing on their
balance sheet. Several parties are involved in these transac-
tions. A “sponsor” cedes liabilities arising from catastrophe
exposure to a special purpose vehicle, which will then carry
out the actual securitisation. The liabilities are transformed
into a marketable cat bond and issued by the special purpose
vehicle. In general, investment banks are also involved as
consultants to sponsors and as distributors of cat bonds to in-
vestors. The sponsor enters into a reinsurance contract with
either a reinsurance company, a subsidiary of the reinsurer or
even directly with the SPV. Cash payments from investors as
well as reinsurance premiums are collected and reinvested by
the SPV supported by a specialised trust (see Fig. 2).
Generated investment returns serve as a loss reserve and
can ﬁnally be used for damage compensation payments to the
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Fig. 2. The basic cat bond structure.
sponsor. For investors the coupons as well as the principal
can be at risk, if the cat bond is triggered, which means that
the contractually determined level of the underlying value or
index is exceeded. Various forms of triggers have been used
for cat bonds: Indemnity-based triggers are related to actu-
ally reported damages. Parametric or technical triggers are
calculated using technical parameters, such as temperature,
storm force, magnitude of earthquakes or rainfall. Index-
based triggers base upon complex simulation techniques us-
ing data from particular insurance markets and also paramet-
ric data sets (see Bantwal and Kunreuther, 1999; Nell and
Richter, 2000).
Cat bonds have proved to be, on the one hand, a valuable
source of capital for companies and, on the other hand, an
attractive asset for investors due to their relatively low corre-
lation with other securities. Thus, cat bonds can contribute
positively to the diversiﬁcation effect in investors’ portfo-
lios. Until 2006 solely large industrial companies issued cat
bonds. But then in June 2006 the government of Mexico took
protective action for the case of a major earthquake by form-
ing a special purpose vehicle to issue catastrophe bonds and
collecting the bond proceeds in a public cat fund.
Theoretically, this structure could also be used for catas-
trophe funding in Austria adding capacity to the national in-
surance market and to public ﬁnancial means. In this case,
the fund could also act as public reinsurer or guarantee fund
for private insurers (see Fig. 6). Moreover, the cat fund could
beneﬁt from higher fund performance and more transparency
as this would be expected by investors.
The most positive feature of cat bonds is that they manage
to reduce moral hazard and agency costs, as the only trigger
of payments is an index calculated on the basis of paramet-
ric or insurance market data. Indemnity-based cat bonds are
triggered either by market-wide damage reports or by insurer
speciﬁc triggers, which can not be inﬂuenced by the insured.
Regarding the criteria of insurability index-linked cat bonds
also facilitate a very precise deﬁnition of the “unique” event,
which triggers payments to the insured. Furthermore, suf-
ﬁcient capital will be provided at the issuance of the bond
adding capital market capacity to the insurance market.
The negative aspect of such products is, though, that the
positive effect of reduced moral hazard might be offset by
the existence of basis risk. Thus, in order to render cat bonds
an efﬁcient tool for ﬁnancial protection against natural haz-
ards it is crucial to choose the appropriate index or triggering
indemnity level. This is also true for all other index-linked
securities, such as weather or insurance derivatives (see also
Brandt and Laux, 2005; Doherty and Richter, 2002; Doherty,
1997, among others).
In contrast to the cat bond structure, insurance and weather
derivativesarealternativesolutionsforcompaniesratherthan
public institutions. Derivatives, such as options, swaps, fu-
tures or forward agreements, which are related to indemnity
of modelled indices (e.g. GCCI, PCSI) are called insurance
derivatives and are usually traded over the counter. However,
as past experience shows this type of derivatives has barely
been deployed, although the CBoT tried to boost the mar-
ket by offering over-the-counter support service as well as
an exchange platform in the 1990s (see Culp, 2006). Since
spring 2007, a new generation of insurance derivatives was
born, which can be traded at NYMEX exchange. Again, the
derivatives are written on the Property Claims Services Index
(PCSI).
Whenever parametric data are used to calculate the under-
lying index, the transactions are denoted as weather deriva-
tives. The contract may, for example, determine a certain
level of the temperature-index. If this level is exceeded
within the contract period, the option is exercised and a cer-
tain amount is paid out in order to compensate for damages
that are expected to be related with this index-level.
Of course, basis risk is a major concern when pricing
weather derivatives and setting the trigger level. Basis risk
arises when the underlying index and the contractual trigger
level do not precisely depict the ﬁrm’s exposure. The more
accurate the contract is adjusted to the actual exposure of a
company, the better basis risk can be reduced.
However, weather derivatives can also be used for diversi-
ﬁcation means. They can also amplify capacities available
for the coverage of weather-related damages, and help to
smooth the balance sheet of any company which intends to
protect itself against damages (see Banks, 2002; Jewson and
Brix, 2005).
Contingent capital solutions link insurance and ﬁnancial
markets by raising funds from capital markets upon the trig-
ger of an insurance-related event. They can either take the
formofcontingentequityordebt. Intheﬁrstcase, acompany
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has the option to issue new equity shares to investors after a
pre-determined event thereby adding equity capital to its bal-
ance sheet and obtaining coverage for losses caused by the
speciﬁed event. In the second case, a company buys the op-
tion to take out a loan after an ex-ante deﬁned event in order
to cover for damages.
From the conclusion of the contract until the realisation of
an actual loss, the company pays an option-like commitment
fee. Therefore, the seller of this option guarantees the com-
pany, in the case of a contingent equity solution, to buy the
company’s shares and, in a contingent debt structure, to pro-
vide credit against ﬁxed contract terms (interest payments,
repayment period, etc.). The company can take advantage of
these contingent capital facilities in the way that either way
the company obtains access to less expensive capital after the
occurrence of a ﬁnancially stressful event. Without this op-
tion, the price for regular funding in the capital markets or
bank loans could be much higher after such an event, as the
company’s liquidity and/or creditworthiness could be damp-
ened at that time (see Culp, 2006).
In the US accounting regulations also allow insurers to is-
sueContingentSurplusNotes(CSN).Thestructurecombines
the notions of cat bonds and equity put options. By selling
trust-issued notes to investors, capital ﬂows into the special
purposetrust, whichpurchaseshighquality securities suchas
T-Bills. Investors are granted higher-than-average yields in
order to give them an incentive to invest into the notes. Upon
the occurrence of a predeﬁned trigger event the insurer has
the right to sell contingent surplus notes to the trust to raise
capital at ﬁxed conditions. This gives insurers improved ac-
cess to capital markets and provides them with capital for the
payment of damage compensations to the insureds.
The advantage of contingent capital solutions in general is
that insurers can obtain a post-loss funding commitment in
advance for ﬁxed conditions that might be difﬁcult to realise
after a loss event, if the option was not in place (see Froot,
2002). Furthermore, the company can strategically choose
between debt or equity solutions, which will mainly depend
on their actual preferences concerning the capital structure.
In contrast to an insurance contract, the company has to re-
pay the loan as soon as the company has recovered again, or,
repurchase its CSN within a certain period after the event.
On the other hand, taking out a loan in times of low sol-
vency can also be risky for a company. If it is not able to re-
cover within the contractually determined period, insolvency
is simply delayed. One could use similar arguments for con-
tingent equity or CSN solutions, as investors will not be re-
munerated with the expected yield any more, if the company
doesn’t recover within a certain period.
Regarding the issues discussed in Sect. 2 contingent capi-
tal solutions can be seen as an attractive alternative to tradi-
tional insurance contracts, in particular in the case of contin-
gentdebtsolutions. Ifacorporateorgovernmentalinstitution
raises funds by using contingent credit lines, moral hazard
should not affect the behaviour of these entities, as the credit
funds must be repaid within a certain period after the event
including interest. The original risk is neither transferred nor
borne by the capital provider. As mentioned above the repay-
ment of the loan might not always be easy after the occur-
rence of a catastrophic event. Thus, the “insured” will prefer
to avoid risk or to take risk-mitigating measures, which leads
to reduced moral hazard (see Neftci, 2000). The concept it-
self resembles the participation of captive owners in proﬁts
and losses, which encourages risk averse behaviour as in the
case of the captive the owners are policyholders and share-
holders at the same time.
Also agency costs should be lower in the case of contin-
gent capital solutions than for traditional insurance contracts.
This relates closely to the accounting issues, which are also
brought up by arbitrage models. Surplus notes as well as
loans increase the companie’s assets, but in contrast to loans
the notes do not increase the liabilities as they are regarded
as policyholders’ surplus (under US accounting rules). This
will regularly have an effect on the behaviour of managers.
As no liabilities have to be considered on the balance sheet in
the case of CSN funding, they will rather be willing to insure
also high risk events as the ﬁnancing will not have a negative
impact on the balance sheet and the shareholder value.
The situation for loans is different, as liabilities need to be
considered in the balance sheet. Thus, agency costs can still
be an issue. The repayment of the loan and the interest need
to be considered in advance when choosing this post-event
funding alternative at a priori ﬁxed contract terms. Though,
lending capital might be a good alternative for companies
or also for public cat funds in order to dispose of additional
liquid capital without the need for earmarking certain inter-
nal funds. In practice, earmarking may rather be difﬁcult to
proceed over longer periods of time. From the accounting
as well as from the political perspective this feature of con-
tingent loans seems to be a crucial aspect. Insurance market
capacities and public funds can be increased by adding ﬁnan-
cial means via the capital market. Due to this diversiﬁcation
of resources companies or public institutions have access to
additional funds independently of insurance market cycles
and the market power of (re-)insurance companies (as men-
tioned in Sect. 2).
Furthermore, the insurability-problem concerning the ac-
curate deﬁnition of the risk event can partly be solved by
using contingent capital structures. Both, contingent equity
and debt structures are typically linked to one or more trig-
gers, for example the industry’s index level or the company’s
stock development in connection with a parametric trigger.
Such structures counter moral hazard, but to a certain extent
they can include basis risk, similar to index-linked catastro-
phe bonds (see Culp, 2004, p. 388).
Regarding the applicability of contingent capital instru-
ments, new regulations would have to be implemented in or-
der to allow insurance companies to issue a special type of
notes, such as the CSN, and to allow for beneﬁcial account-
ing. Currently, the CSN structure can only be applied under
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Fig. 3. The basic ﬁnite (re-)insurance contract.
US law. Contingent credit lines (loan commitments) can al-
ready be applied by Austrian companies. This mechanism is
well established in the ﬁeld of hedging unfavourable credit
events worldwide (see Neftci, 2000).
Therefore, contingent capital solutions may serve as sup-
plemental sources of ﬁnancial means for private but also pub-
lic institutions in times of capacity shortages in insurance
markets.
Finally, the concept of ﬁnite reinsurance may be a use-
ful alternative to classical insurance contracts. The term ﬁ-
nite reinsurance was deﬁned in the EU Directive 2005/68/EC
(OJ 2005 L 323/1) as a reinsurance contract under which
the explicit maximum loss potential exceeds the premium
over the lifetime of the contract by a limited but signiﬁ-
cant amount, together with at least one of the following two
features: (i) explicit and material consideration of the time
value of money; (ii) contractual provisions to moderate the
balance of economic experience between the parties over
time to achieve the target risk transfer.
The early ﬁnite risk contracts were called time and dis-
tance policies offered by Lloyd’s of London. The treaties
involved the payment of a large one-off premium by the ced-
ing insurer to the reinsurer, as well as a ﬁxed schedule for the
repayment of funds to the cedent at maturity. Due to the fact,
that these policies only transferred timing risk, leaving aside
underwriting risk, they faced major regulatory problems and
were abandoned (see Culp, 2006).
Today, ﬁnite contracts can be concluded either between
an insurer and reinsurer, or between industrial company and
an insurer. The mechanism is deployed in order to manage,
transfer and/or ﬁnance various types of risk, such as ﬁnan-
cial, operational or timing risks. In contrast to this, tradi-
tional contracts solely provide cover for actuarial risks. Fi-
nite (re-)insurance may also feature the consideration of pos-
itive loss histories, participation clauses and multi-year con-
tract periods in order to spread insured risks over time. The
premiums paid to the (re-)insurer are collected in a so-called
loss-experience account for the entire contract period and
can ﬁnally be paid back to the cedent, if the collected pre-
mium capital has not been used for damage compensations
(see Fig. 3). These repayments may also include investment
returns (see Banks, 2005; Holzheu et al., 2003).
Finitecoverscantaketheformofretrospectiveorprospec-
tive covers. This means that they can either transfer risks
which were already realised in a past period, but though have
not been reported to the cedent yet; or in the case of prospec-
tive covers, they cover present and future losses. The spe-
cial feature of ﬁnite risk contracts is that the (re-)insurer will
provide additional capital, if the means of the experience ac-
count are not sufﬁcient in order to cover the damages. In this
regard the structure equals traditional excess-of-loss-covers.
The main advantages arising from ﬁnite risk contracts are
the transfer of both timing and underwriting risk with ﬂexible
weights in each part, as well as the possibility of smoothing
balance sheets and improving insurers’ ratings. Because of
the combination of risk transfer and ﬁnancing this concept
made authorities doubtful concerning the proper legal treat-
ment of ﬁnite risk contracts. Most controversies were de-
clared by the EU Directive, but some questions are still to be
discussed further (see also Culp and Heaton, 2005).
However, the concept itself is convincing and can be ap-
plied by private or public business entities which prefer to
bundle various types of risk, transfer them to another busi-
ness entity and see their premiums accumulated in their in-
dividual loss-experience-account. Although ﬁnite risk con-
tracts have not been used by public institutions in the past,
they could be a good vehicle for linking public funds with
the reinsurance industry and vice versa.
Similar to captive and contingent capital structures also
ﬁnite risk contracts help to reduce moral hazard due to the
integration of ﬁnancial market structures. As ﬁnite risk con-
tracts are combinations of ﬁnancing and insurance contracts,
the “insured” has an incentive to mitigate risks in order to
keep the level of funds in the loss-experience account as high
as possible. The better the loss experience, the higher is the
repayment at the end of the contract period. Another posi-
tive aspect of this type of insurance contract is that it helps
to increase available capacities, as risks can be bundeled,
transferred, ﬁnanced and spread over time, which in com-
bination with the XOL-feature of these contracts facilitates
an enhanced capital availability at the occurrence of a risk
event.
Though, also ﬁnite risk contracts are typically treated as
insurance contracts from an accounting perspective, which
implies that the contracts may not help to become more in-
dependent of insurance market cycles or to reduce agency
issues from the managers’ perspective. Also, the insurabil-
ity (along the criteria deﬁned in Sect. 2) of the risk itself is
equal in the case of ﬁnite and traditional insurance contracts.
Therefore the main advantage of ﬁnite risk contracts is the
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 8, 603–616, 2008 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/8/603/2008/M. Gruber: Alternative solutions for public and private catastrophe funding in Austria 613
ﬁnancing feature combined with an XOL cover, wich makes
this risk transfer mechanism an attractive alternative for pri-
vate and in particular for public catastrophe funding.
Captive insurance companies, cat bonds, contingent cap-
ital solutions, insurance and weather derivatives as well as
ﬁnite (re-)insurance contracts are primarily used by compa-
nies. But there are crucial arguments for considering these
instruments to be useful alternatives, or also simply supple-
ments to public funding as it is carried out at present. In the
following section, some solutions are suggested for a con-
joint use of alternative and traditional as well as private and
public concepts. Concrete suggestions will be made for the
integration of alternative structures into the Austrian catas-
trophe funding system.
4 Public private partnerships and alternative funding
In the past, various forms of collaboration between pub-
lic and private entities have been established in order to
manage projects in the ﬁelds of construction, health care,
transportation and communications infrastructure. In most
cases, institutions decided to enter a public private partner-
ship (PPP) in order to obtain and beneﬁt from a central plat-
form, which is responsible for funding, planning, imple-
menting and maintaining a certain project (see Smith and
Wohlstetter, 2006; Davies, 2006). In particular for com-
plex and very costly projects this type of partnership is con-
sidered more and more advantageous (see for example the
establishment of the Brenner Eisenbahn GmbH, Bonaven-
tura Strassenerrichtungs-GmbH in Austria; PPP projects in
Germany as described in German Institute of Urban Affairs
(2005)).
The notion of PPP has not been deﬁned on EU community
level yet. However, the European Commission stated in its
Green Paper on PPPs that the term refers to forms of coop-
eration between public authorities and the world of business
which aim to ensure the funding, construction, renovation,
management or maintenance of an infrastructure or the pro-
vision of a service (see Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2004). In addition, characteristics of PPPs were
identiﬁed, such as the relatively long duration of the relation-
ship, the method of joint funding, the crucial role of the eco-
nomic operator as well as the distribution of risks between
the public and the private partner.
The European Commission found that the major incentive
for PPPs during the last years can be seen in budget con-
straints of the member states. Using the words of Michael
Saunders, the private sector is taking on new roles as States
seek to meet more public needs with fewer dollars. He con-
tinues by explaining that PPPs facilitate project cost savings,
improved quality and system performance from the use of
innovative materials and management techniques, and that
PPPs may substitute private resources and personnell for
constrained public resources (see Saunders, 2006).
Fig. 4. Potential public and private partners in Austria.
These statements are not only true for the funding of trans-
portation or health care infrastructure, but also regarding the
market for insurance covers. Therefore, PPPs must be con-
sidered as a means for providing new sources of capital and
obtainingaccesstomarketsinordertosupplementtraditional
insurance market capacities (see Fig. 4).
Returning to the concepts presented in the previous sec-
tion, one could, for example, suggest to use a captive struc-
ture as a platform, primarily for accumulating and managing
ﬁnancial means. Private households, companies or organisa-
tions (e.g. tourism associations) could write policies with this
captive. Additionally, the captive structure can also issue cat
bonds or manage the risk portfolio by using weather deriva-
tives, ﬁnite risk contracts or also contingent debt solutions.
The structures would be the same as shown in Figs. 1, 2 and
3.
This arrangement would enable private and public institu-
tions to collaborate strategically and to optimise the incentive
system in Austria, i.e. by attuning compensation payments
funded by private insurers and others funded by the govern-
ment. If more than one institution, either private or public,
founded a joint captive the structure can be compared to the
mutual insurance structure, already existing in Austria, but
with the difference that the captive members would not nec-
essarily be bound by a joint and several liability. Also, rein-
surance coverage can be accessed directly by the members
via the captive (see Fig. 5).
Furthermore, this self-insurance structure may indirectly
improve the private or public institutions’ risk management
policy. First of all, risks need to be identiﬁed and assessed
accurately. If the institution does not follow a strategic ap-
proach for assessing and dealing with its risks the real ex-
posure would not be known. This could cause unforeseen
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Fig. 5. PPP in the form of a captive structure in connection with other alternative risk transfer mechanisms.
Fig. 6. Austrian cat funding system with governmental catastrophe bond.
negative effects in the case of a catastrophic event, as losses
may be higher than initially expected. Consequently, strate-
gic risk management is crucial regarding the institutions’ sol-
vency in the long-run. Only if the institution is aware of its
true risk exposure, risks can be managed and either trans-
ferred or ﬁnanced in an efﬁcient way.
The mentioned alternative mechanisms may also be ap-
plied independently from each other. For example, the sys-
tem in Austria could be structured as follows: Basic cover
is provided by primary insurers, as for example insurance
against moderate storms and ﬂoods. Additional coverage
can be obtained by industrial companies or associations of
private individuals by means of alternative capital market so-
lutions, such as weather derivatives, insurance derivatives,
contingent loans or even corporate cat bonds.
Originally, when the ART market was still at a starting
point, these instruments as well as the captive or ﬁnite risk
insurance concepts were only applied to the reinsurance mar-
ket. Over the years the ART market has developed further
and is now offering tools which have proven to be effec-
tive also for industrial companies regarding the expansion
of coverage supply and capacity in general. Because of
this, a growing number of European insurers and credit in-
stitutions have become interested in ART mechanisms. A
few Austrian credit institutions have “experimentally” of-
fered weather derivatives. Some Austrian industrial compa-
nies even purchased such weather contracts over the counter
from reinsurance companies or at exchanges (e.g. CME).
As studies have shown (see for example Bank and Wiesner,
2008; Bank and Gruber, 2008) many companies in Austria,
which are not insured against natural hazards for various rea-
sons, are hardly informed about alternatives to traditional in-
surance contracts. Thus, in future the communication and
information policy has to be considered as a major issue in
order to obtain a higher insurance market penetration, not
only by traditional but also alternative means, in Austria.
As an “excess-of-loss cover” and third element in this sug-
gestive system the Republic of Austria issues a cat bond (as
shown in Fig. 6) in order to increase the amount of avail-
able cat funds. By this means the Republic can add ﬁnancial
means obtained from the bond issuance to the capacity of the
public cat fund, or it can even replace a portion of the cur-
rent fund. The issuance is conducted either directly by the
state or by a special purpose vehicle supported by a reinsur-
ance company. In the latter case, the cat fund (i.e. the state)
closes a reinsurance contract with this intermediary which
probably facilitates an easier handling of the structure in gen-
eral. The bond proceeds as well as the insurance premiums
paid by the cat fund to the reinsurer are transferred via a spe-
cial purpose vehicle to a trust and is invested in high-rated
securities. Floating rates may also be swapped in order to
guarantee ﬁxed coupon payments to the investors, who lend
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capital to the government. Thus, the structure is compara-
ble to a classical government bond, but with higher coupon
payments rewarding for the catastrophe risk exposure.
The trigger might, either be parametric, for example, cal-
culatedonthebasisofAustrianprecipitationandtemperature
reports, or indemnity based. In the latter case, the bond will
be triggered if, for example, the damages required payments
higher than a certain level (assume 200 mio. Euro). Conse-
quently, the investors will not receive coupon payments and
if necessary, also the principal is “at risk”. The cashﬂows are
transacted either via the reinsurer or directly from the SPV to
the Republic of Austria (i.e. the public cat fund).
Presumably this system would require legal amendments.
Particularly the distribution of ﬁnancial means from the pub-
lic catastrophe fund to concerned private and corporate enti-
ties would need to be well determined in order to actually im-
prove the system as a whole. In conclusion, the availability
of additional ﬁnancial means for catastrophe funding must be
seen as an advantage, but regarding practical issues the dis-
tribution scheme and criteria are decisive for the success of
traditional as well as alternative mechanisms.
5 Conclusions
Insurance markets regularly go through soft and hard market
phases. In particular on the latter, a lot of research has been
done in order to explain why at a certain point of time insur-
ance premiums rise and market capacities decrease. There
is no doubt that in hard market phases, which are usually
caused by major events, insurance industry is not capable
of covering all damages, if a catastrophe occurs. However,
catastrophes may cause ﬁnancial distress in both, hard and
soft market phases.
Alternative mechanisms have been developed – mainly
by the capital and reinsurance markets – which can be ap-
plied in order to provide additional capital that is needed
for damage compensation payments. Captives, cat bonds,
insurance and weather derivatives as well as ﬁnite reinsur-
ance and contingent capital solutions were presented as al-
ternatives available to public and private entities. Most of
these mechanisms – originating in the US – have success-
fully been used worldwide by companies since the 1980s,
either in a separate or combined way. The paper suggests to
integrate these concepts into the Austrian insurance system
and to open minds for more ﬂexible structures that facilitate
collaboration among private and public entities. Experience
shows that positive effects of PPPs prevail, no matter if they
were applied to improve prevention and mitigation of dam-
ages, or to improve recovery processes after major events.
At this point one should remark that a ﬁrst attempt for the
creation of a special catastrophe pool was made by consider-
ing a public private terror pool. However, the pool remained
a “private private partnership” including Austrian insurance
companies as the state was not willing to grant its guaran-
tee to cover an excess-of-loss layer. Alternatively, this pa-
per suggests to encourage public decision makers to provide
funds for XOL covers by applying securitised products, such
as cat bonds or contingent capital facilities, or by applying
captive and ﬁnite risk insurance.
In the end, the ideas outlined in this paper, would – if put
into practice – beneﬁt the Austrian economy and society, as
catastrophe funding would no longer be associated with lim-
itedinsurancesupply, scarcecapacitiesandintransparentdis-
tribution mechanisms.
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